United Democratic Front president Atupele Muluzi has argued that Malawi has achieved political liberation twice over but has failed, on both occasions, to convert that freedom into meaningful economic gains for ordinary citizens.

Writing in a chapter titled “The Bumpy Ride of Malawi’s Liberation: From Hope to Despair and Back Again”, part of a new collection, Why Liberation Movements Fail: Perspectives from Across Africa, edited by Greg Mills and Ray Hartley, Muluzi sets out his central thesis: that Malawi has repeatedly changed governments without changing the underlying system of governance itself.

Quoting a senior civil servant he interviewed for the chapter, Muluzi writes: “Malawi has repeatedly changed who governed, not how the country was governed.”

The former cabinet minister traces this pattern through what he describes as two distinct liberation moments – the attainment of independence in 1964, and the restoration of multiparty democracy in the 1990s – arguing that both fell short of the transformation Malawians had been promised.

He opens the chapter with Mario Cuomo’s well-known observation that politicians “campaign in poetry” but “govern in prose”, using the line to draw a distinction between the emotive power of liberation movements – built on promises of hope, sacrifice and dignity – and the harder, less romantic work of governing, which demands institutions, competence and difficult economic trade-offs.

In Malawi’s case, he argues, the poetry of liberation succeeded while the prose of governance did not.

The first liberation ended colonial rule, Muluzi writes, but eventually gave way to one-party authoritarianism under Hastings Kamuzu Banda.

The second ended that one-party system and restored multiparty democracy, but, in his assessment, failed to deliver economic liberation – leaving the country instead with “disillusionment, weak institutions and persistent poverty”.

It is from this diagnosis that Muluzi develops his concept of a “Third Liberation”: a citizen-led effort intended to complete what he sees as the unfinished work of Malawi’s first two political transitions. This phase, he argues, must move beyond simply replacing political leaders and instead focus on transforming the institutions and economic structures that shape ordinary Malawians’ opportunities.

Speaking in July, Muluzi described the Third Liberation as a programme built around “creating jobs, expanding opportunities, and ending the economic system that has failed to deliver prosperity for many citizens.”

He argues Malawi has instead developed what he terms a “rentier system”, in which economic opportunity is concentrated in the hands of powerful interests.

In a separate interview earlier this year, Muluzi went further still, describing Malawi as an “economic capture project” that he alleges is controlled by a network with influence over government, the courts, the media and the marketplace – allegations that remain his own characterisation and have not been established by any independent investigation.

He points to the transport sector and the Affordable Inputs Programme as examples of what he regards as entrenched vested interests.

On the risks of challenging that system, Muluzi is blunt: “If you try to reform the system, they isolate you, they target you, and they crush you.”

He also connects Malawi’s economic troubles to the growing exodus of young Malawians seeking opportunity abroad.

“Our biggest export today is our own citizens,” he says, arguing that emigration reflects the domestic economy’s failure to generate sufficient opportunity at home.

For Muluzi, the answer is not simply another change of government. He calls instead for stronger institutions, a more professional public service, economic reform, greater investment, and a system that rewards enterprise and productivity rather than political connection – a shift, as he frames it, from a “politics of privilege” to an “economy of opportunity”.

The chapter draws on interviews with politicians, businesspeople, civil society figures, religious leaders and ordinary Malawians.

Muluzi’s intervention forms part of his ongoing effort to promote the Third Liberation as both a political and economic argument for Malawi’s future; in July he said the country’s next phase must prioritise “job creation, expanding opportunities, restoring dignity, strengthening public institutions, and ensuring that economic growth benefits all citizens.”

The wider volume examines the record of liberation movements across the African continent, asking why organisations once synonymous with freedom, sacrifice and justice have so often struggled to deliver democratic accountability and economic transformation once in power.

For Muluzi, Malawi’s experience offers a clear lesson: political liberation alone is not enough. The country, he argues, still has to complete the transition from freedom from colonial and authoritarian rule to freedom from poverty, economic exclusion and institutional dysfunction.

That unfinished business, in his account, is the case for a Third Liberation.